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Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over
Autonomy Regimes for Minorities
Henmy J. Steiner
Intense ethnic conflicts have become landmarks of regions
throughout the postwar world. These conflicts have brought about
a terrible devastation of lives and places. They are responsible for
a high percentage of the systematic violations of individual human
rights in the modern world, and their toll threatens to grow.
This ongoing violence has led to debate about the wisdom of
developing international law norms on autonomy regimes for eth-
nic minorities. Such regimes amount to governmental systems or
subsystems administered or staffed by a minority or its members.
This Article explores. the problems posed by autonomy regimes.'
Since these regimes bear on vital matters addressed in the modem.
world by the human rights movement, the Article argues that
ideals inhering in that movement should inform the ongoing de-
bate. It tests autonomy, regimes against these ideals as expressed in
two basic human rights instruments: the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights2 and the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights.
3
The recurrent conflicts have spurred efforts to draft interna-
tional instruments dealing with minorities' problems by seeking to
avert the circumstances that lead to violence.4 Those instruments
* Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Professor of Law and Director of the Human Rights Program,
Harvard Law School.
1 An earlier version of the Article was presented at a symposium on ethnic conflict
at Notre Dame Law School in Febrnary 1991. 1 am grateful for the helpful comments
then made on my presentation, and for later comments of my colleagues Randall Kenne-
dy and Martha Minow.
The Article forms part of a more comprehensive project of examining autonomy
regimes. Its principal theme of ideals and counter-ideals will figure as a part of my pend-
ing article, Steiner, Minorities and Autonomies, in ETHNIC CONFUCt AND THE U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS SYSTEM (H. Steiner ed. forthcoming).
2 GA. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter the Universal Dec-
laration].
3 Opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter Civil-Political Rights Covenant].
4 An open-ended working group of the U.N. Human Rights Commission is prepar-
ing a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Reli-
gious or Linguistic Minorities [hereinafter the Draft Declaration]. A recent version of that
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elaborate norms in the form of declarations and conventions. The
norms in the present drafts bear principally on rights of minority
members individually (like rights to equal protection, fair process,
free speech, and association). To some extent, they address claims
of minorities in their group or collective character. Some of those
claims involve autonomy regimes.
This Article argues that autonomy regimes, or some forms
thereof, find indirect but significant support in several prominent
norms of the human rights movement. Moreover, they can be
understood to reinforce some underlying ideals of that movement
as a whole. On the other hand, these regimes can undermine
other powerful human rights ideals, and to that extent embody a
morally problematic counter-ideal. Nonetheless, the Article asserts
that this contradiction between autonomy regimes and human
rights ideals should not itself resolve the debate whether such
regimes should gain some measure of recognition in international
law. Often ethnic minorities have understandably viewed those
regimes as necessary not simply to assure their cultural survival,
but principally to avoid oppression and violence. In such circum-
stances, autonomy regimes may be justified as "least worst" solu-
tions to almost intractable problems, perhaps frustrating the full
realization of important ideals but ending or forestalling unjust
rule.
I. THE NATURE OF AUTONOMY REGIMES
The minority groups seeking autonomy regimes (or schemes,
arrangements) are typically described as ethnic, religious, linguis-
tic, or national origin in character. This Article uses the term
"ethnic" as a shorthand way to describe all such minorities,
whatever their distinctive mark.' That term then encompasses
declaration is set forth in 46 U.N. ESCOR at 11. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/41 (1990).
Several European projects look toward the elaboration of rights of minorities and
their members. Within the Helsinki process, see chapter IV of the Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, June 29, 1990, reprinted in 11 HUM. RTs. L.J. 232,
242 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Document]. On Feb. 8, 1991, the European Com-
mission for Democracy through Law, a consultative body of the Council of Europe,
adopted a Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of Minorities, reprinted
in 12 HuM. RTs. L.J. 270 (1991) [hereinafter European Convention Proposal].
5 The Article ignores nonethnic minorities that may also enjoy autonomy rights-for
example, a self-governing regional population that constitutes a minority of a state and is
polyethnic in character. Moreover, it does not consider the distinctive problems of one
important type of minority, indigenous peoples. The Drafi Declaration, supra note 4, does
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groups as diverse, and as relatively cohesive or diffuse, as the
Flemish in Belgium, blacks and Jews in the United States, and
persons of North African ancestry in France. Often ethnic minori-
ties possess two or more of these defining characteristics-Basques
in Spain, Gypsies in Hungry, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Palestinians in
Israel, Kurds in Iraq, and the Francophone population in Canada.
Such varied illustrations indicate the range of relationships
between these minorities and the balance of a state's population.
The differences between the minority and others may be relatively
inconsequential. Indeed, the minority may be in the process of
assimilation into the dominant culture. On the other hand, the
differences may be profound and divisive, reaching to basic world
views and individual identity. Policies of the majority or dominant
groups in a society may lessen tensions or, by denying minority
groups fair shares or opportunities, may exacerbate problems to
the point of risking conflict that threatens social order. In these
latter circumstances, the claims of ethnic minorities for autonomy
schemes will become most insistent.
Three types of schemes figure in this discussion. Each has an
impressive range of variations, such that a bare reference to an
"autonomy scheme" tells us nothing about its social context or
salient details, and hence nothing about its political and moral
character.6
The first type consists of power-sharing regimes. Such regimes
carve up a state's population in ethnic terms to assure one or
several ethnic groups of a particular form of participation in gov-
ernance or economic opportunities. For example, members of a
religious or linguistic minority may be constitutionally entitled to
elect a stated percentage of members of the national legislature
through the use of separate voting rolls that list competing candi-
dates drawn only from the relevant minority. All legislators who
are members of a particular minority may be authorized to vote as
a bloc with power to veto proposed measures adversely affecting
not take account of indigenous peoples. The U.N. has followed a different institutional
track to elaborate norms for such peoples, including norms involving autonomy schemes.
Despite having many issues in common, the categories of ethnic minorities and indige-
nous peoples raise distinctive problems that recommend separate analyses.
6 The variety of historical (and possible) arrangements of the types of autonomy
schemes sketched in the following paragraphs is illustrated in writings like Lijphart, The
Power-Sharing Approach, in CONFICT AND PEACEKEEPING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 491 U.
Montville ed. 1990); Duchacek, Federalist Responses to Ethnic Denands: An Oveview, in FED-
ERALISM AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION (D. Elazar ed. 1979).
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the minority, such as a change in official languages or voting
schemes. Representatives of a minority may be assured of formal
consultation by the government before decisions are taken on
issues like development projects. Power-sharing schemes may re-
serve for minority groups designated cabinet positions or a certain
portion of the judiciary. Belgium and Lebanon offer present and
historical illustrations of a relative success and a tragic failure in
power-sharing arrangements.
A second type of autonomy scheme gives an ethnic minority
political control of a certain territory. Either through devolution
of powers or through a federal structure assuring the central gov-
ernment and regional components of designated powers, a
territorially concentrated ethnic minority can govern its own affairs
to a greater or lesser extent: Indian states, Catalonia in Spain.
How extensive those powers are-regional elective government,
command of local police, control over natural resources, manage-
ment of regional schools-depends upon the bargain reached
between a minority and other political forces in the society.v
The third type of autonomy regime provides that members of
an ethnic community will be governed by a personal law distinc-
tive to it, usually a law of religious origin. All members of a reli-
gious community, whether a majority or minority-Jews, Muslims,
and members of different Christian communities in Israel; Muslims
and Hindus in India-may be subject to a religion-based family
law that is applied by religious courts. Like power sharing, a per-
sonal law can provide an important degree of autonomy and cohe-
sion even for minorities that are territorially dispersed.
Autonomy schemes may be rooted in deep customs and not
take formal legal expression. But normally they are spelled out in
constitutions or statutes identifying the particular ethnic group(s)
benefiting from the scheme and the type of participation in gover-
nance or economic benefits given such group(s). That is, autono-
my arrangements constitute part of a state's system of government.
7 Many autonomy schemes in contemporary states have only indirect and contingent
correlations with ethnic minorities, and hence stand outside the themes of this Article.
Thus federalism and devolution of powers have generally led to separately governed re-
gions of a state that have polyethnic populations. See Glazer, Federalism and Ethnicity: The
Ex'perience of the United Stes, 7 Publius 71 (1977). After centuries of voluntary and co-
erced migrations, and as a result of urbanization and high personal mobility, only a few
countries like Switzerland, India, and the Soviet Union (at least until the recent rash of
many republics' assertions of sovereign independence) have boundaries for regional gov-
ernments that are even roughly congruent with different ethnic minorities.
[Vol. 66:1539
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Those individuals or institutions administering a scheme-religious
courts applying a personal law, an ethnic government of a particu-
lar region, administrators of a power-sharing ar-
rangement-exercise governmental power and hence appear sub-
ject to provisions of human rights instruments giving individuals
rights against government.
Autonomy regimes benefiting ethnic minorities can work radi-
cally different effects on a society. For example, a personal law
distinctive to a group will not directly affect nonmembers or touch
major political issues like political participation. On the other
hand, governance of a component region of a federal state by an
ethnic minority will influence political participation and the distri-
bution of resources. That local control, however, will not itself
assure the ethnic minority of a significant voice in a central gov-
ernment that retains many powers affecting the minority's welfare.
Power-sharing in the central government may protect a minority
against certain prejudicial changes, as by the minority's exercise of
a bloc veto power. But it may fail to empower that minority to
exert effective pressure for desired changes. Even in a democratic
regime, the minority, absent the possibility of coalition politics,
may be consistently outvoted and ignored, its interests and claims
effectively dismissed.
II. AUTONOMY REGIMES AS GROUP CLAIMS OR RIGHTS
Most rights declared in human rights instruments have an
individual character evidenced by their wording ("every person")
and content (the right to a fair trial, to travel, to free speech). At
the same time, many such rights constitute vital conditions to the
formation and functioning of groups, including ethnic minorities.
Rights of members of minorities to use their own language, to
practice their religion, or to associate, are necessarily exercised
jointly by individuals. In this respect, such individual rights have
an inherently collective character.
Other human rights norms, such as those assuring individuals
of nondiscriminatory treatment, necessarily implicate groups at the
outset. They demand that the state (and to some extent nongov-
ernmental actors) refrain from disadvantaging an individual be-
cause of a group characteristic or identity. The individual's link to
the relevant group constitutes the very occasion for discrimination.
1991]
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Protecting a person from discriminatory treatment benefits all
members of the group, as well as the group collectively.'
In the contexts of the rights thus far referred to, a legal sys-
tem does not identify an individual's particular group identity
(religious, racial) as a condition to the assertion of a right by that
individual. A statute in the United States need not specify that
ethnic minorities like Asian Americans, blacks, or Jews have rights
to association or equal protection. These general norms address all
minorities and their members. All persons benefit equally.
Constitutional or statutory provisions giving preferential treat-
ment to members of disadvantaged ethnic or gender
groups-including affirmative action policies authorized by human
rights instruments prohibiting discrimination--have characteristics
of both individual and group rights. Individuals belonging to an
identified group can assert legal rights based on affirmative action
provisions to strengthen their chances of gaining, say, employ-
ment. In so doing, they rely on their group identity as set forth in
the relevant legal provisions. By advancing their private interests,
they serve the underlying purpose of advancing the welfare of the
group as a whole.
Consider how these observations bear on autonomy regimes.
If we for the moment imagine a "right" to these regimes, it would
contrast markedly with the range of rights previously described.
Autonomy rights would lie unmistakably on the collective side of
the boundary between individual and group rights. If we speak not
of "rights to" but of "claims for" autonomy regimes, those claims
are made by the relevant minority in its corporate character and
again have a collective nature.
The group character of such rights or claims appears in nu-
merous ways. Often autonomy schemes stem from agreements
8 These rights to equal protection are generally enforced judicially and administra-
tively through proceedings involving individual members of the group suffering discrimi-
nation. In some countries, a range of procedural devices and legal concepts may main-
tain a formal distinction between individual and group actions, but draw the two closer
together. In the United States, the use of a class action to challenge gender or racial
discrimination gives the lawsuit a systemic, group character. Class actions based on the
U.S. Constitution that seek school desegregation may effectively pit a relevant (black)
population against a relevant government authority. Class actions alleging employment
discrimination and based on statutory standards may have a similar group and systemic
character.
9 See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against




negotiated between an ethnic group and the central government
or between different ethnic groups. Those agreements are then
ratified in constitutions or statutes. This process of negotiation and
bargain generating an agreement emphasizes ethnicity and groups.
Moreover, ethnically constituted bodies implement many autonomy
schemes: a religious court administering a personal law; a regional
government consisting principally of members of the regionally
dominant ethnic group; and an ethnic political party functioning
within a power-sharing scheme assigning to that ethnicity a given
number of legislators. Autonomy schemes bring society a long step
closer to communal organization.
Within some autonomy schemes, such as a personal law ap-
plied by religious courts, individuals may be able to contest before
secular courts the application (or nonapplication) to them of the
personal law. But in most schemes, the ethnic group itself, whatev-
er its form of corporate organization or expression, would be the
appropriate complainant to remedy a violation of autonomy ar-
rangements. The questions are so fundamental to a state's organi-
zation and the distribution of power among ethnic groups, and
the potential solutions are so detailed and varied, that planning
and implementing such schemes ,likely requires recourse to politi-
cal negotiations and processes rather than to judicial remedies.
III. BASES FOR AUTONOMY REGIMES IN
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
Although autonomy regimes lack a concrete base in the major
human rights instruments, their advocates can, nonetheless, find
support for their arguments in important norms in those instru-
ments.' Three provisions of the Civil-Political Rights Covenant
are particularly relevant: articles 1, 25, and 27.
The principle of self-determination in article 111 has been
applied primarily to claims for sovereign independence, or so-
called external self-determination, particularly in the context of
10 My argument, here tersely summarized, is elahorated in my pending article, supra
note 1.
11 Paragraph 1 of article 1 provides: "All peoples have the right of self-determina-
ion. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development." Paragraph 3 requires parties to the
Covenant to "promote the realization of the right of self-determination," and to "respect
that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." Civil-
Political Rights Covenant, supra note 3, at art. 1.
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decolonization as colonized peoples gained the status of sovereign
states. Nonetheless, there are reasons for interpreting article 1 to
reach also to the internal affairs of states, to so-called internal self-
determination, given both its permissive wording and its position
as the introductory article of a human rights covenant that speaks
primarily to rights exercised within a state.12 It is true that even
under this broad interpretation of article 1, ethnic minorities de-
manding internal self-determination through an autonomy regime
could not easily draw directly on it. Among other obstacles, that
article refers to self-determination not by minorities but by "peo-
ples.""3 Despite such impediments, the powerful idea of collective
self-determination that article 1 expresses would be helpful to
advocates of autonomy schemes for ethnic minorities.
Article 25's declaration of a right of citizens to political partic-
ipation 4 involves both a concrete right, the vote, and a general
right to "take part" in governance. Among other goals, autonomy
schemes achieve particular, distinctive forms of political participa-
tion for ethnic minorities. Their advocates can draw on article 25
to argue that many ethnic minorities lack effective political voice,
often because of authoritarian and repressive government, but also
in circumstances where majoritarian democracy so functions as to
give the minority no effective electoral power or political leverage.
The thrust of that argument would be the claim that only an
autonomy regime could give the minority and its members the
kind of fair or equitable political participation that article 25
should be interpreted to require. 5
By conferring the right to enjoy and develop one's own cul-
ture-what we can term a "cultural survival" right-article 27
12 See generally Cassese, Political Self-Delermination-Old Conceplts and New Developments, in
U.N. LAW: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 137 (A. Cassese ed. 1979).
13 See generally THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (J. Crawford ed. 1988). For a brief discussion
of collective rights, peoples, and minorities, see Capotorti, Are Minorities Entitled to Col-
lective lnternatwnal Rights?, 20 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HuM. RTS. 351 (1990).
14
Every citizen shall have the right ... (a) To take part in the conduct of public
affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be
elected at geuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suf-
frage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of the electors ....
Civil-Political Rights Covenant, supra note 3, at art. 25.
15 Compare the references to notions like fair or equitable participation in art. 3(2)
and art. 7 of the Draft Declaration, supra note 4, art. 35 of the Copenhagen Document,
supra note 4, and art. 14 of the European Convention Proposal, supra note 4. See Steiner,
Political Participation as a Human Right, I HARv. Y.B. Hum. RTS. 77, 105-13 (1988).
[Vol. 66:1539
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blends the individual and collective aspects of a minority cul-
ture.16 Formally it gives rights to individuals, but the thrust of the
article is to stress culture as a communal, group phenomenon.
Advocates of autonomy schemes could find in article 27 some
support for their argument that only such schemes can assure the
survival of the distinctive culture of many ethnic minorities.
17
These are adventuresome arguments. They do not leap ready-
made out of the Universal Declaration or the Covenant. Nor do
they command significant support among states or even among
actors within the human rights community. My point then is not
to assert the Covenant's decisive influence on a debate about
autonomy regimes. To the contrary, one must argue boldly and
inventively to demonstrate that important provisions of human
rights law can be interpreted to lend qualified support for some
forms of autonomy.'8
IV. IDEALS AND COUNTER-IDEALS
The question here explored goes beyond the prior
discussion's stress on the relevance to autonomy schemes of specif-
ic human rights provisions. We now inquire whether those
schemes tend to realize vital ideals pervasive to the entire human
rights movement, and paradoxically threaten at the same time to
subvert those very ideals.
Let us first consider how autonomy schemes reinforce a basic
human rights ideal. The Universal Declaration and Civil-Political
Rights Covenant accept and, indeed, encourage many forms of
16 "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language." Civil-Political Rights Covenant, supra note 3, at
art. 27.
17 See F. CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC, RELI-
GIOUS AND LINGUIsTic MINORITIES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No.
E.78.XIV.1 (1979); C. Tomuschat, Protection of Minorities under Artick 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in FESTSCHRII-T FUR HERMANN MOSLER 949 (R.
Bernhardt, W. Geck, G. Jaenicke, & H. Steinberger eds. 1983).
18 In this Article, I do not consider another level of justification for autonomy re-
gimes-the argument that from psychological and sociological perspectives individual iden-
tity and (ethnic) group identity are- often linked, and that autonomy regimes respond to
deep needs of people to gain self-respect and security by feeling part of their "own"
community. See CONFLICT AND PEACEKEEPING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES U. Montville ed.
1990); Mack, Natialism and th Self, 2 PSYCHOHISTORY REv%. 47 (1983); Berlin, Nationalism.-
Past Neglera and Present Power, 46 PARTISAN REX'. 337 (1979). My arguments here are con-
fined to those having some plausible basis in the ideals expressed by human rights law.
1o91)
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diversity. They insist on respect for difference, an insistence ex-
pressed only in part through the particular attention given ethnic
minorities in article 27. The value placed on the survival (and
creation) of diversity in cultural, religious, political, and other
terms permeates human rights law, which evidences throughout its
hostility to imposed uniformity.
The ideal of protecting and encouraging diversity informs
many human rights provisions. No other norm in the human
rights corpus plays as vital a role in the struggle to realize that
ideal as the principle of equal protection, perhaps the preeminent
human rights norm. 9 Its premise of the equal worth of individu-
als and their right to equal respect necessarily applies to the eth-
nic groups with which individuals are associated, for discrimination
has the same systemic character whether it is directed against a
group as a whole or selectively against a member. Article 26 of the
Covenant defines broadly the kinds of groups protected against
discrimination. It obligates state parties to give "to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other
status."" Many of the designated groups have a natural character;
people are born into the groups, rather than choose them.
Other rights declared in basic human rights instruments com-
plement the ideal of equal respect and confirm the value placed
on diversity. Everyone has a right to adopt "a religion or belief of
his choice" and has freedom "either individually or in community
with others and in public or private" to manifest belief or religion
in practice and teaching." Rights to "peaceful assembly"22 and
"freedom of association with others, in each case qualified by
typical grounds for limitation like public order or national securi-
ty, further commit the human rights movement to the protection
of people's ongoing capacity to form, develop, and preserve differ-
ent types of groups.
19 That principle figures importantly in the United Nations Charter (article 55(c)),
the Universal Declaration (article 2) and the Civil-Political Rights Covenant (articles 2
and 26). Entire conventions such as those on gender and racial discrimination are built
on it.
20 Civil-Political Rights Covenant, supra note 3, at art. 26.
21 Id. at art 18.
22 Id. at art. 21.
23 Id. at art. 22.
(Vol. 66:1539
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We have noted that such provisions of the Universal Declara-
tion and Civil-Political Rights Covenant are expressed in terms of
individuals' freedom and choice of action, but that their individual
and collective characters are nonetheless inextricably linked. This
must be so. Groups and communities, not isolated individuals,
transmit culture from one generation to the next. They embody
and give significance-to cultural and social differences in a society.
Hence we see the link between autonomy regimes and an ideal of
maintaining diversity. Since those regimes protect, indeed en-
trench, diversity in group terms, they must constitute an effective
means to realize this fundamental human rights ideal.
These observations about the unmistakable significance of
groups in the human rights movement for purposes including the
preservation of differences might strike particular critics of the
human rights movement as concealing more than they reveal.
Some critics argue that the movement imposes on cultures
throughout the world the concepts and norms expressing the
extreme individualism of the developed West. That individualism,
rooted in liberal ideology, is said to contrast markedly with the
distinctive communal character or cosmologies of many Third
World states.24 Detached from collective or communal moorings
to history, culture, and belief, individualism leads to assimilation of
all persons into an undifferentiated mass culture reinforced by
industrialization, urbanization, and pervasive as well as invasive
media. The West has been successful in exporting such material
and cultural attributes of its modern life to many traditional soci-
eties, thereby subverting their communal organization and encour-
aging a global homogenization.
This distinction between the developed West or liberal theory
and many Third World societies tells an important truth, but is
too starkly drawn with respect to its contrast between an individual
and communal organization of social life. However guarded (if not
hostile) the references in much liberal political theory may be to
groups and group rights,2" civil society in the "liberal" world is
significantly composed by groups, including not only groups of
24 Seej. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THIEORY AND PR\GrICE (1989) (par-
ticularly chs. 3, 6, and 8); Pannikkar, Is the Notion of Human Righ4s a Western Concept?, 120
DIOGENEs 75 (1982); POLIAS & SCHWAB, Human Rights: A Western Construct with L mited
Application, in HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (A. Pollis & P. Schwab eds. 1979).
25 &e J. SIGLER, MINORITY RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALISIS (1983); V. VAN DYKE,
HUMAN RIGHTS, ETHNICITY AND DISCRIMINATION (1985).
1991] 11549 ,
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choice like economic and political interest groups or social clubs,
but also natural groups like ethnic minorities acting through asso-
ciations. The vast majority of people have substantial and vital
relationships with communities whose distinguishing characteristic
(religion, ethnicity, language, national origin) they share. Ethnic
identity, communities, and blocs are not exclusive properties or
problems of the Third World, even if the claims of community in
that world are often deeper and more preclusive of other indi-
vidual associations in social life.
In any event, my concern is not with the West or with liberal
theory, but with the relation between autonomy regimes and the
human rights movement. That movement did not incorporate the
ideology or myth or stereotype of atomistic individualism as a
governing premise or a social ideal. 6 Such a premise or ideal
would have been fatally distanced from social reality in many states
that participated in drafting the Civil-Political Rights Covenant or
that later became parties to it. It would have starkly contradicted
too vital and visible a feature of social existence. The basic human
rights instruments necessarily assume that groups and communities
constitute major components of social life.
By valuing diverse cultural traditions, and by its related protec-
tion of groups, human rights law evidences what must be a basic
assumption-namely that differences enrich more than endanger
the world. They contribute to a fund of human experience on
which all individuals and groups can draw in the ongoing process-
es of change and growth. Ethnic groups nourish that fund. The
diversity that they supply endows a society with different histories,
experiences, beliefs, ideals, arts, and cultures. The survival of dis-
tinctive characteristics of ethnic minorities guards against the trend
toward homogenization that has accompanied Western develop-
ment, technology, and material prosperity, and Western influence
on the rest of the world. Autonomy regimes of ethnic minorities
defend cultural survival rights in counteracting this trend. In given
26 This assertion becoines the more forceful as we consider not only the Universal
Declaration and the Civil-Political Rights Covenant. but also the companion covenant that,
together with the prior two instrumnents, forms the so-called International Bill of Rights.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976), expresses a sense of
shared responsibility through duties of the state (and, thus, of its citizenry), to be pro-
gressively fulfilled, to maintain some mininm level of welfare consistent with resource
and other constraints. Id at art. 2. That Covenant too is at odds with an effort to char-
acterize the human rights movement as expressing a vision of detached egotistic individu-
als proceeding in isolation toward their respective destinies. '
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contexts, they may be useful or essential to the preservation of a
culture.
Given this intimate relationship between the survival of differ-
ences and autonomy regimes, one could imagine a system of inter-
national norms that protected difference by requiring the state to
facilitate strict autonomy regimes. Rights given ethnic minorities by
human rights law to internal self-determination through autonomy
regimes could amount to authorization for them to exclude "oth-
ers," in the manner of states exercising their sovereign power to
control crossings of their frontiers within a territorially fragmented
world. Ethnic groups could be empowered to erect and enforce
cultural, political, ideological, and (if they were geographically
concentrated) physical boundaries. Consistent with these imagined
norms of international law, they could participate in the hermetic
sealing of ethnic communities into their own enclaves. Each com-
munity could not only deny entry to alien persons or ideas, but
perhaps deny exit to its own members.
27
Such a normative arrangement raises obvious, serious issues.
The ideal in the human rights movement of preserving difference
cannot so readily be bent to support the creation of autonomy
regimes. To the contrary, a further elaboration of that ideal
prompts a deep criticism of such regimes and their fragmenting
effects.
Consider at the outset the relation of autonomy schemes to
the norm of equal protection; We noted earlier that these
schemes in some ways complement one purpose of a nondis-
crimination norm of preserving differences. Institutionalized sepa-
rateness, however, also violates the spirit and perhaps the letter of
that norm.
A state must give all its citizens equal protection. Power-shar-
ing schemes proceed on a contradictory premise. They are cast in
ethnic terms (group X is assured of x% of the legislature or cabi-
net or judiciary or military, group Y of y%) and thus explicitly
discriminate among groups on grounds, like religion, language,
race, or national origin. Separate voting rolls or application forms
27 For the moment, I assume that such a sealing would be possible in a modem
world of international capital flows, mobile populations, invasive media, and other forms
of deep cultural interpenetration. Moreover, I assume that boundaries would separate
starkly independent and distinctive communities. In fact, many differences among cultures
of ethnic groups that were dramatic and profound several centuries ago have sharply
eroded, from the onset of colonialism through tihe political, economic, and technological
phenomena of the modern age.
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for civil service positions drive home the lesson that socioeconom-
ic life and career turn on ethnic bonds. Separate personal laws for
each religious community, particularly if enforced within a manda-
tory assignment system permitting no escape by community mem-
bers to a nationwide secular law, dramatize citizens' particular
rather than shared characteristics.
2 s
Consider further the effects of autonomy regimes on cultural
change. Human rights law, we have argued, rests on the belief
that people learn from and grow through experiencing the chal-
lenges of diverse groups. It is largely for such reasons that differ-
ences among peoples and cultures have the capacity to enrich
human experience and expand human potential. But autonomy
arrangements may institute a counter-ideal of not simply preserv-
ing but also locking into place the historical differences among
groups.
To a lesser or greater degree, autonomy schemes frustrate a
major objective of the human rights movement of assuring that
societies remain open to challenge and change. That movement
institutionalizes no one ideal of social order. To the contrary, it
explicitly allows for many faiths and ideologies while denying to
any one among them the right or power to impose itself by force.
It expresses a humanistic commitment to ongoing inquiry and
diversity, as well as a deep skepticism about any final truth. It de-
nies governments the right to close avenues of reflection, criticism,
advocacy, and innovation in order to impose any orthodoxy. To
the extent that autonomy regimes protect historical differences but
inhibit the creation, as it were, of fresh differences, they would
convert the human rights movement's framework of protection of
open inquiry and advocacy into the protection of static traditions.
A state composed of segregated autonomy regimes would resemble
28 A contrast can be drawn with school racial segregation in the United States. That
system compulsorily separated blacks from whites, and amounted to a form of autonomy
regime instituted and enforced by the state (by component states within the American
federal system). Black citizens were given no choice, and the compulsory character of
school segregation was important to the decisions of the Supreme Court finding it un-
constitutional. Autonomy regimes considered in this Article differ. They generally stem
from negotiations between the central governmneni and minority groups, or negotiations
directly between such groups. The resulting accommodations are then ratified in law.
Nonetheless, even assuming that a rigorous standard of free and voluntary choice were
met by the processes leading to agreement over a scheme, the fact remains that differ-
ences among ethnic groups expressed in autonomy regimes are institutionalized and en-
forced both by central government and by ethnic communities. The concept of equal
protection/nondiscrimination must at least be qualified to justify such regimes. Quite
clearly, all are not treated the same, different treatment stemming from ethnic identity.
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more a museum of social and cultural antiquities than any human
rights ideal.
Provisions of the Civil-Political Rights Covenant point to this
understanding of the human rights movement as a whole. The
freedom of expression declared in article 19, for example, in-
cludes "freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers."' But the under-
standing rests on broader notions than specific norms can yield.
Two deep characteristics of human rights law are here rele-
vant. The first characteristic involves the relation between groups
and individuals. Communities have a right to guard their own
integrity, but only within the constraints imposed by human rights
norms on governments' treatment of individuals, including the
equal respect due to all members of a society. The central govern-
ment of a state must respect individual conscience and choice. So
then must ethnic communities within a state when they exercise
(constitutionally based or statutorily delegated) governmental pow-
er over their members by applying a personal law or exercising a
territorial authority or administering a power-sharing scheme in
the central government.
In wielding governmental power, ethnic minorities may violate
human rights norms in numerous ways-for example, by discrim-
inating among their members on grounds forbidden by those
norms, except to the extent that disadvantaged members can be
understood to "accept" the discriminatory treatment as part of
their cultural tradition.' Within practical and cultural constraints,
which may indeed be so deep and powerful as to block individuals
from exercising any choice, all persons should be seen as empow-
ered by human rights norms to decide whether to remain on one
29 Civil-Political Rights Covenant, supra note 3, at art. 19.
30 I make this point boldly to set forth the argument clearly, but recognize that it
raises many complex questions and, while vital, must be qualified. A group's treatment of
its own members within an autonomy regime poses issues about cultural relativism and
universalism in human rights norms, see texts, supra note 24, and about the degree to
which cultural survival for many communities may be understood to require practices vio-
lating human rights instruments-practices like gender discrimination or government by a
nonelected leadership. The notion of members' "acceptance" of practices like discrimina-
tion or severe forms of punishment is itself problematic: what kind of acceptance, in
what, if any, context of choice or even knowledge of alternative social arrangements? The
notion of "disadvantaged" members may itself be problemaic, as a concept drawn from
an alien political and moral framework. See the discussion of some of these issues in
Minow, Pulling Up and Pulling Doum: 7blerance Recmusidered in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION-
AL. FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA 77, 88-94 (M. Tushnet ed. 1990).
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side of a cultural boundary, to shift to another side, or to seek a
life not committed to one or the other community.31
A second characteristic of human rights law pointing toward
open boundaries within a state concentrates on the polity as a
whole rather than on individuals. Strong ethnic consciousness and
concentration may stamp out the desire or even capacity for
broader political or cultural associations. Formal legal barriers
reinforce the natural tendencies of a group's members to look
inward and assume only a particular identity, rather than to expe-
rience the tension between the particular and a more diffuse or
broader identity as a citizen or human being.
As the sense of a common humanity weakens, alliances among
people that shatter ethnic boundaries become more unlikely.
Polyethnic political formations resting on generic interests like
economic class or political ideology will confront decisive obstacles.
Demonization of "the other" may become part of an ethnic
group's credo and stamp out the possibility of developing empathy
for others. Such extreme manifestations of ethnic bonds will be-
come the cardinal obstacle to a human rights consciousness, at
least with respect to attitudes of members of the ethnic group
toward "the other." Enforced ethnic separation both inhibits inter-
course among groups, and creative development within the iso-
lated communities themselves. It impoverishes cultures and peo-
ples.
The distinctions between the ideals or pictures of social life
that inhere in the human rights movement as a whole and those
that point toward autonomy regimes can be stated with different
degrees of contrast. Much turns on the strength and exclusivity of
the autonomy regimes. For example, advocates of these regimes
may argue that the inclusive ideals of the human rights movement
are ultimately desirable for a state, but that autonomy is necessary
for a transitional period. Such an argument may be based on
circumstances of necessity, such as the incidence of violence de-
scribed below, or on the view that some degree of autonomy is
essential for maintenance of the group's culture against the on-
slaught of the modern state. On the other hand, those advocates
31 Although human rights norms encourage intercourse among individuals and
groups of different ethnic character by offering every protection for it, they surely do not
so require. Within the spirit of human rights law, choice about exclusive or inclusive
lives, about insulation from or involvement with others, remains with individuals. Autono-




may decisively reject human rights ideals as alien and evil since
they risk the subversion from within or without of a religious or
other tradition that binds a community together.
Autonomy regimes differ in other salient ways. The regime
may involve relatively slight group differentiation and barely affect
outsiders (a personal, religious law of marriage and divorce), or it
may separate groups with respect to political matters of vital signif-
icance for all members of the polity (separate voting rolls, quotas,
and so on). Within a federal state, an autonomy scheme for a
geographically concentrated ethnic minority may grant that minori-
ty modest self-government and retain vital powers for the central
government, or grant it extensive powers that border on self-rule.
Those administering an autonomy regime may invite popular par-
ticipation or may subject a population to decision-making powers
of, say, religious officials.
For purposes of clarity and emphasis, the following list of
ideals or pictures of social life bypasses these important distinc-
tions, assumes strong and exclusive autonomy regimes, and hence
states the differences in terms of stark contradictions.
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Human Rights Ideals and














for change in cultural tradi-
tion
Attention to individual choice
in affiliation with
ethnic group
Strong Autonomy Regime Ideals
and Pictures of Social Life
Self vs. others, avoid strangers
Ethnic identity as total iden-
tity
Stress on the particular, what
is exclusive rather than
shared





History (myth) looking, sta-
bility-oriented
Affiliation as identity, a given




V. THE NEED FOR AUTONOMY REGIMES
One way of testing the preceding observations is to inquire
whether justifications as deep as those supporting, for example,
rights to personal security or freedoms of conscience or expres-
sion, also support autonomy schemes for ethnic minorities. Can
the same broad consensus among many political traditions and
religions be identified with respect to "rights" to separate regimes
for different ethnic groups within the modem state? Or, on the
other hand, are autonomy arrangements better understood as
contingent, perhaps contextually necessary, ways to achieve desired
ends such as peaceful coexistence rather than as ends that are val-
ued in and of themselves?
The question raised is whether autonomy regimes express
respect for difference or express despair over the possibility that
diverse peoples can live with difference. Their widespread use in
diverse countries and their potential effectiveness in realizing im-
portant goals indicate that these arrangements, if not ideal, are
not anathema. They may rest on genuine acceptance by all affect-
ed communities. They may grow out of concrete and agonizing
histories, frequently involving authoritarian and abusive rule over a
minority that has been denied a fair share of power, resources,
and opportunities. Often the product of negotiations between
hostile communities seeking to contain discord that may have led
to violence, they appear to be justified in such circumstances as
the best available solution to otherwise unyielding problems.
Separation of ethnic communities through power-sharing ar-
rangements, regional governments, and personal laws may then
constitute a practical necessity, a "least worst" solution that is sure-
ly preferable to ongoing violence and systemic oppression. The
solutions that they bring to ethnic conflict may improve chances
for pacific co-existence and provide the only realistic alternative
not only to continuing oppression, but to a split of the contend-
ing ethnic groups into two states. Internal self-determination
through autonomy schemes may blunt a minority's demands for
external self-determination.
The distinction that I have drawn is a vital one: recognizing
that autonomy regimes in given contexts may be preferable to
other arrangements, or alternately characterizing autonomy re-
gimes as a "right" to be declared in international norms. The
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rhetoric of rights legitimates claims and mobilizes support for
groups demanding autonomy. That rhetoric empowers and encour-
ages. It goes beyond the welfare maximizing, contextual justifica-
tion for autonomy regimes as "least worst" solutions to pressing
situations.
An effort to develop minorities' autonomy rights would con-
front serious problems. At the outset lie those of practical politics.
States, whose representatives sit on the intergovernmental bodies
that will consider draft declarations or conventions affecting mi-
norities, resist the elaboration of such rights. The realization of
autonomy rights necessarily diffuses power among groups so as to
weaken political control at the state's center. Correctly or incor-
rectly, the central government may see that shift as entrance on a
dangerous path leading toward the state's dismemberment through
external self-determination.
Even if states' attitudes were less suspicious or hostile, autono-
my rights involve the conflicting ideals that I have underscored.
Many advocates of human rights will therefore be ambivalent
about, or hostile toward, their elaboration. If autonomy regimes
are principally justified by their potential for ending oppressive
,rule, an elaboration of norms about those regimes must be atten-
tive to the justify'ing circumstances and context. A "right" to re-
gimes so varied in character and so dependent on circumstances
almost defies elaboration.
Despite these problems, the argument for Tecognizing in cer-
tain circumstances the justice or legitimacy of minority claims for
some form of autonomy regime deserves support. The high inci-
dence of ethnic conflicts and the particular dangers that they pose
for the ethnic minorities require that the United Nations and
regional institutions examine the possibility of international regula-
tion. International attention to the systemic, structural aspects of
ethnic conflict must be given a chance to show what it is capable
of achieving, including achievement through the development of
international law in this field. Given the reluctance of a govern-
ment to support the development of international law principles
favorable to autonomy schemes that may be relied on by dissident
ethnic groups in its own state, or its reluctance to intervene in
ethnic conflicts in foreign states and thereby risk others' interven-
tion in its own internal disputes, the effort to achieve progress at
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the start through a United Nations declaration confronts dramatic
obstacles.3 2 But the effort must be made.
The development of international norms on minority regimes
(this Article bypasses the political complexities of effective enforce-
ment of those norms) would institutionalize discussion about mis-
treatment of minorities as groups, and hence about political struc-
tures unjust to minorities. International attention to such issues
would correct the human rights movement's tendency to consider
ethnic conflicts almost exclusively from the perspective of viola-
tions of rights of individuals.3 - It may inhibit destructive practices
of states toward minorities, and enable threatened minorities as
such to have recourse to intergovernmental bodies.
The form that recognition of claims to an autonomy regime
might take (how firm or flexible a norm, how detailed or gener-
al); the circumstances that would justify a minority in making such
a claim; the conditions (about, say, rights of a minority's mem-
bers) to which the administration of an autonomy scheme by an
ethnic group would be subject; whether such a scheme should be-
supported only as a necessary transitory arrangement en route to
an open society-all these are questions to be rigorously explored.
The rhetoric of rights may here be inappropriate, even misleading.
Elaboration of principles indicating the circumstances that justify
minority claims may be preferable. 4 My argument here is simply
32 It should be borne in mind that international regulation of ethnic minority claims
for some form of autonomy would represent an important, but not a dramatically differ-
ent, kind of "intervention" into a state's affairs. The entire human rights movement
amounts to such an "intervention," as demonstrated by the broad recognition of how
deeply that movement has eroded the concept of domestic jurisdiction. All human rights
influence the distribution and exercise of power in a country, from the prohibition of
torture (limiting the means that a government can use to suppress opposition) to the
vote (which, if freely exercised by all, would radically transform government and economy
in many states). Se Steiner, The Youth of Rights (Book Review), 104 HARv'. L REv. 917,
928-32 (1991).
33 It has been consistendy difficult'to bring minority issues before the U.N., at leat
without some significant degree of internationalization of ethnic conflict or without the
support of a major power. See Koshy, Ethni" COn[iCt in Sri Lanka and th1 U.N. Human
Rights Systen, in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS SysTEM (H. Steiner ed.
forthcoming) for a description of proceedings involving the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict
before the Human Rights Commission and the Subn-Commission, proceedings in which
almost exclusive attention was given to violations of core individual rights rather than to
the ethnic and political structures giving rise to the conflict as such or to the related
claims of some Tamil groups for an autonomy scheme.
34 In the article, Minorities and Autonomies, supra note 1, 1 suggest some ways in
which norms about autonomy regimes might be developed, particularly through so-called
directive principles that could be combined with process-oriented requirements imposed
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that this exploration must be undertaken. The problems in ignor-
ing minorities' demands for some form of autonomy scheme may
prove to be more serious than the problems in working out norms
about such schemes.
on a government and a Clissident ethnic initority.
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